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BANKS AS INSTRUMENTS OF THE NAZI THEFT 
OF JEWISH PROPERTY IN SERBIA DURING THE 
SECOND WORLD WAR
Ву Vesna S. Aleksić
SUMMARY: This paper is looking into whether there was a met- 
hod - and ifyes, what kind of method - in the Nazi racist experi- 
ment conducted in the banking system of Serbia during the World 
War 2, and to establish the exact value of Jewish-owned property 
was stolen during that period.
From the 1920 incident in a Munich brewery, to the early attempts to divide German nationals into first - and second-ra- te citizens by standards of racial purity and "German blood" (as laid out in Mein Kampf, political platform calling for the rebirth of humanity in an ethnically homogenous national state), to the passing of the so-called Nuremberg Laws in 1935, now officially introducing anti-Semitic measures, cases of harassment of Jews multiplied and got more and more brutal.However, there was one important area in the life of the Gerrnan state where Jews were still considered a valuable asset: есопоту or, more precisely, banking and financial sectors, tra- ditionally dominated by Jews ever since the beginnings in the 18th century. Their experience, skillfulness and, above all, good international connections - the guarantor of the much needed economic stability - were crucial to the Third Reich, which was undergoing economic recovery and preparing for war.Following the annexation of Austria, in 1938, the Reich gained full control of the Austrian banking sector, heavily reli- 
ant on the intemational Jewish capital and the expertise of Je- wish bankers. German/s racial experiment extended to this sec- tor as well. The Deutsche Bank, one of the leading private banks in Сегтапу^, expressed interest in acquiring Austria's number- one bank, the Creditanstalt-Wiener Bankverein, affiliated with intemational capital circles (British, Belgian, Swiss and Czech).* 2 The leadership of the Reich found this interest to be perfectly in line with its policy of absorbing the Austrian eco- nomy as quickly as possible and placing German capital in the countries of Southeastem Europe, where this Austrian bank had many partners, of which three in Yugoslavia: Jugoslovenska udmžena banka, Zemaljska banka za Bosnu i Hercegovinu and Opšte jugoslovensko bankarsko društvo.3 Because of its loca- tion, combination of know-how and means, as well as its inter- national importance, they chose Vierma to be the link between the Reich and the countries of Southeastern Europe, its supple- 
*Already during the economic crisis, the management of the Deutsche 
Bank showed a strong liking for the measures for economic recovery propo- 
sed by the National Socialists, and soon established contact with them. Only 
three out of 33 members of the bank's management came from the bank's ad- 
ministration, while all the others represented various industrial sectors and in- 
surance companies. See: Milan Ristović, Nemački "Novi poredak" i Jugoistoč- 
na Evropa 1941/1942 - 1944/1945, Planovi o budućnosti i praksa, Beograd, 
1991, p. 225.
2 Since 1919, the Wiener Bank-Verein was run by an intemational consor- 
tium, led by one of Europe's oldest banks, Societe Generale de Belgique, from 
Brussels, founded in 1822. Other members of this powerful consortium were: 
Banque Belge pour Г Etranger, a subsidiary of Societe Generale de Belgique, 
with headquarters in Paris due to the volume of its own operations, under a 
different name, and another two Swiss banks: Banque Commerciale de Bale, 
from Zurich, and Basler Handelsbank, from Basel. In March 1930, Deutsche 
Bank und Disconto Gesellschaft joined the consortium, as did a little later the 
Czech Bank Union, from Prague. See: Eric Bussiere, Pascal Griset, Cristophe 
Bouneau, Jean-Pierre Willot, Industrialisation et societes en Europe occiden- 
tale 1880-1970, Paris, 1997, 111-113; Lother Gall und andere, Die Deutsche 
Bank 1870-1995, Munchen, 1995, p. 378-379.
3 Eberhard Czichon, Die Bank und die Macht, Hermann Josef Abs, die De- 
utsche Bank und die Politik, Koeln, 1995, p. 155-156.
mentary partners. The city was to be the center of all their inte- rests.4 This is why already since 1936 Germany tried to stren- gthen the presence of its capital in Yugoslavia by founding the first German-owned bank there. However, the preponderance of Czech, French and Swiss - i.e. Western European - financial ca- pital in the Yugoslav banking sector proved to be a serious pro- blem.The acquisition of the shares of Creditanstalt-Wiener Ban- kvereina opened a window of opportunity for Deutsche Bank to seize a Controlling package of shares in its major subsidiary in Yugoslavia, Opšte jugoslovensko bankarsko društvo, A.D., the All-Yugoslav Banking Society. One of the biggest private foreign banks in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the Society was run by the leading Austrian, Belgian and Czech bankers, members of the executive and supervisory boards, one half of whom were Je- wish. In addition, all the directors, senior managers and most of the staff of the Belgrade head office and the branches in Zagreb and Novi Sad were also Jewish. Besides, by way of generous lo- ans, this bank supported a number of businesses owned predo- minantly by local or foreign Jews.5The German financial circles liked the fact that the fore- ign-capital share in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia's private banks amounted to as much as 62 percent, enough to keep the state's credit policy under control? Grouped around the Middle Euro- pean Economic Council (Mitteleuropasche Wirtschaftstag, MWT), together with other German and Austrian business peo- ple - the heart of German economic (and political) power until 1941 - they founded the Yugoslav-German chamber of commer- ce in 1936. In fact, that уеаг saw the take-off of the Four-Year *
4 Andrej Mitrović, Nacistička ideja velikog privrednog prostora i jugoistoč- 
na Evropa (1940), in: "Zbomik Filozofskog fakulteta", Vol. XI-1, Beograd, 
1970, p. 723.
5 Vesna S. Aleksić, Banka i moć, Socijalno-finansijska istorija Opšteg jugo- 
slovenskog bankarskog društva A.D. 192- 1945, Beograd, 2002, p. 73-92.
6 Sergije Dimitrijević, Strani kapital u privredi bivše Jugoslavije, Beograd, 
1958, p. 16.
Plan, Hitler's project for gearing German/s industry towards military production within four years. The plan was supervised by Hermann Goering. Therefore, the chamber's primary mission was to facilitate a more aggressive German presence in Yugosla- via, while at the same time setting up strong economic intelli- gence service.7 This brought to Belgrade Goering's special envoy for Southeastem Europe, Franz Neuhausen, that same уеаг. Another Austrian, Georg Saal, was appointed the chamber's head. Together with another high-ranking official of MWT and Deutsche Bank, Hermann Josef Absom, these two men will be instrumental in giving German financial capital full control over the Society.7 8 9
7 Milan Ristović, op. cit., p. 116.
8 State Archive of Serbia and Montenegro (ASCG), fund of the Opšte ju- 
goslovensko bankarsko društvo (151) - f. 1 - j.o. 1: minutes and reports from 
the sessions of the Managing Board for fiscal years 1938 and 1939; State Sec- 
retariat for Intemal Affairs of the People's Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FNRJ), Administrative Office of the State Security, Vol. II, Nemačka obave- 
štajna služba u staroj Jugoslaviji (German Intelligence Service in the Old 
Yugoslavia), Beograd, 1955, 32, p. 159-160.
9 For more details, see: Vesna S. Aleksić, Otpuštanje Jevreja službenika 
Opšteg jugoslovenskog bankarskog društva A.D. 1940. godine, in: "Godišnjak 
za društvenu istoriju", ГЦ 1/1997, Beograd 1998, p. 49-53.
As of 1939, German/s military advances were immedia- tely followed by her largest banks' taking new territories. The banks initially seized the controlling package of shares of the Czech division and then, in 1940, of the Belgian branch of the Creditanstalt-Bankverein, i.e. the All-Yugoslav Banking Society. Ву summer that уеаг, the Deutsche Bank had already owned 93 percent of the Societ/s shares. Stating routine staff shrinkage, it immediately started to lay off non-Aryan employees in Belgra- de, Zagreb and Novi Sad. Although the Yugoslav govemment protested against the change in ownership structure, this bla- tantly anti-Semitic act left the Yugoslav public indifferent? In the eyes of the Third Reich, the successful implementation of the racist Nazi-Socialist classification of staff created almost perfect conditions for this bank to become German/s main fi- 
nancial instrument for ensuring her economic and subsequently political position in Yugoslavia. With new management at its helm, the bank, which until 1939 worked as the main channel of financing of both local and foreign Jewish industrial and tra- de companies, now assumed a clear political role in the frame- work of Germany's war-oriented есопоту - a fact to which it owns its historical importance.10 11
10 Vesna S. Aleksić, op. cit., p. 73-92.
11 ASCG, 151, see material of the Directorate Office of the Banking Soci- 
ety (BD), 1941-1944; it was not before March 1942 that BD officially applied 
with the Ministry of National Есопоту for a new name. However, in the ap- 
plication the Bank virtually guided the Ministry through the registration pro- 
cess in order to be in full compliance with the wishes of the German trade and 
military administration in Serbia.
Following the 1941 April War and the breakup of Yugosla- via, the All-Yugoslav Banking Society was divided into two twin banks (the Banking Society for Croatia and the Banking Society, in Belgrade). However, its role and its management largely re- mained unchanged. What made the status of the Banking Soci- ety somewhat special was that, although officially a Serbian bank, controlled by the newly founded Serbian Ministry of Na- tional Есопоту, it was, in fact, a German bank, given that its operations and business policy were controlled exclusively by the German members of the management, which ensured its autonomy. Therefore, H. J. Abs, Josef Joham, Nikola Berković and Ludwig Fritscher were at once members of the manage- ments of both societies, in Zagreb and Belgrade. At the session of the Managing Board of the Banking Society in Belgrade, held on October 21, 1941, F. Neuhausen was nominated chairman of the Belgrade division, while another member of the manage- ment, J. Soengen, was appointed head of the military admini- stration for Southeast at the Serbian National Bank.HThe list of documents issued by the military commander of Serbia, under number 7 of Мау 31, 1941, contains the Decree on the Provisional Regime of Banking Operations and Transfer of Мопеу, banning the Serbian nationals from disposing of their 
deposit and savings accounts opened before April 18, 1941, as well as opening their personal safe deposit boxes in the absen- ce of German foreign-сттепсу deposit supervisors. In addition, Jews were required to declare their entire property, and Jewish- owned stores and companies were placed under the authority of a special commissaratJ2 Jewish property was now managed by the Jewish Property Protectorate at GBW, supervised by F. Neuhausen. After some hesitation, their personal belongings and jewelry were transferred under the control of the German operative group Sipo-SD.12 3 During the first month and half, 3,498 Belgrade Jews had their property registered.14 15Ву a new decree of July 22, 1941, their entire property was confiscated and they could no longer dispose of their real estate, savings and credit accounts and personal deposit boxesJ5 Next, Jewish stores and companies were put up for sale, mostly to German trade and military officials in Serbia. The топеу from these sa- les, as well as the outstanding amounts collected from Jewish 
12 According to a special order of April 19, 1941, the Belgrade Jews we- 
re required to register with the German military authorities. Out of 12,000 
Jews living in Belgrade until April 1941, 9,145 persons registered by June 12, 
1941. See: Savez Jevrejskih opština FNRJ, Zločini fašističkih okupatora i nji- 
hovih pomagača protiv Jevreja u Jugoslaviji (Crimes of Fascist Occupying For- 
ces and Their Collaborators Against Jews in Yugoslavia), Beograd, 1952.
13 Christopher R. Browning, Konačno rešenje u Srbiji - Judenlager na Saj- 
mištu - Studija slučaja, (The Final Solution in Serbia - Judenlager in Sajmi- 
šte - A Case Study), in: "Zbomik Jevrejskog istorijskog muzeja", 6, Beograd, 
1992, p. 408.
iJovanka Veselinović, Spisak Jevreja i supružnika Jevreja koji su prema 
Naredbi Vojnog zapovednika u Srbiji od 30. maja 1941. podneli Opštini gra- 
da Beograda prijave o imovini (List of Jewish persons and their spouses who 
following the Decree of the Military Commander in Serbia of Мау 30, 1941 
submitted ргорепу registration forms to Belgrade municipal authorities), in: 
"Zbomik Jevrejskog istorijskog muzeja", 6, Beograd, 1992, p. 375-406.
15 In the meantime, the Decree of Мау 31,1941 no longer applied to non- 
Jews in Serbia. See also: Jaša Romano, Ladislav Kadelburg, The Third Reich: 
initiator, organizer and executant of anti-Jewish measures and genocide in 
Yugoslavia, in: "The Third Reich and Yugoslavia 1933-1945", Beograd, 1977, 
p. 674.
debtors, went to the Banking Society, to the frozen "Unterdepot" accounts with the distinctive three-letter maiT- "GBW".16
16 ASCG, 151 - ArcHred records of expopriated Jewish ргорепу in BD^ 
1942-1944; Zločini fašističkih okupatora...(Crimes of the Fascist Occupying 
Authorities...), p. 46.
17 Vesna S. Aleksić, op. cit., p. 132-150.
18 Idem
19 Idem
Given that during the first war уеаг in Serbia it was unre- alistic to make plans for economic development, the Society used the confiscated Jewish property to "increase the volume of operations and savings". The 1941 annual report shows a 140.3 percent increase in balance compared to the previous уеаг. Most of the funds came from the liquidation, i.e. sale of a large num- ber of Jewish companies and other real estate owned by Jews which the German authorities had seized from their rightful owners.17All the confiscated Jewish property was registered on spe- cial accounts belonging to the General Trade Representative for Serbia at the Society, where they were deposited by the SD (Sic- herheitsdientst - Gestapo), the Devisenpolizei, various other German institutions, commissariats for Jewish property and lo- cal banks. Sales of goods, businesses and real estate were sta- ted as the sources of these funds. All the fmancial transactions were taken care of for each сотрапу by special commissaries and through separate accounts at the Banking Society. After the sale, i.e. the "Aryanization" of property (one of the accounts was marked "Arisierungserloese"), the funds were deposited onto the collective account of the general trade representative for Serbia, marked "GBW".18 19According to the 1942 business report, the annual balan- ce of payments account recorded a surplus of 701.538,867 di- nars (from 972.679,423 in 1941, to 1.674,218,290 dinars in 1942).’9 In the meantime, as finding buyers for Jewish property became increasingly difficult, the representatives of the Reich 
gave it to the state of Serbia as a "gift" in exchange for higher war-damage payable by Nedić's (Serbian prime minister) go- vemment?0 On August 26, 1942, the Serbian Finance Ministry transferred the control of Jewish property to the State Hypote- сагу Bank, which auctioned it off and paid the топеу earned through these sales to the account of the "Jewish Property Ad- ministration Board - Real Estate". Reparations to Germany we- re paid from this account.20 1 223Even the Banking Society transfer- red several of its accounts receivable from Jews to the State Hypotecary Bank, demanding their settlement against the sale of Jewish property.22 Based on the research by historian Nikola Zivković, 1 billion dinars had been collected through the sale of Jewish real estate by December 14, 1943, of which 600 million went to the Department of Military Administration for the рау- ment of war damages to the ethnic Germans from the Banat re- gion, while the rest was spent on the reconstruction of the Bor mining complex, etc.2^
20 Jaša Romano, Ladislav Kadelburg, Idem. 674; The Commissariat for Je- 
wish real estate managed to sell 133 pieces of land until September 1942, to- 
taling 147 million dinars, despite the fact that their real value was estimated 
to have exceeded 10 million. See: Zločini fašističkih okupatora... (Crimes...), 
9.
21 Jaša Romano, Ladislav Kadelburg, Idem., 674, Zločini fašističkih oku- 
patora... (Crimes...), 49.
22 ASCG, 151 - File "Prijava jevrejskih dugova - Državna hipotekama ban- 
ka, 1942, 1944" (Registration of Jewish Debts - State Hypotecary Bank, 
19452,1944). In July 1944, this bank successfully sold a house in 6, Skender- 
begova Street, property of Hajim Bararon, one of BD's debtors. However, 
desptie its obligation to do so, it failed to inform the BD about this transac- 
tion, prompting the German branch to intervene requesting to be paid the 
amount of exactly 531,249 dinars, with a 9.5 percent interest. There are no 
data confirming that the State Hypotecary Bank complied with this request.
23 Nikola Živković, Ratna šteta koju je Nemačka učinila Jugoslaviji u Dru- 
gom svetskom ratu (German War Damages in Yugoslavia in the Second World 
War), Beograd, 1975, p. 446.
However, the constant lack of топеу compelled the Ger- man occupational authorities to, by the end of 1942, move the entire Jewish property - savings accounts, stock, insurance po- 
licies, jewelry, gold and other valuables - kept in Serbian banks and branches of the former Yugoslav banks to the vaults of the Banking Society in Belgrade, and that upon special orders by the general trade and commerce representative in Serbia on the sale of Jewish banking debts and deposits at credit banks.24 With Jewish companies now seized and sold, it was time to appropri- ate the shares they had in Serbian companies and financial in- stitutions. According to Miodrag Ugričić, a senior adviser at the National Bank of Yugoslavia, the National Bank of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, then under the process of liquidation, and the Serbian National Bank played an active role in this undertaking. They authorized and supervised the transfer of amounts corre- sponding to "old" and new outstanding Jewish debts made du- ring the occupation, from the Banking Society to the account of the general trade and commerce representative for Serbia. This transfer was carried out gradually, from December 1942 till 1944, according to the category of debt and the time needed to establish the amounts, i.e. to "liquidate" them. That this was an extensive effort is clear from the fact that the Banking Society now even controlled the payments from the prisoners’ camps — if the recipients or senders were Jewish. The National Bank alo- ne transferred more than 18 million (18. 487,868, to be exact) dinars to the accounts at the Banking Society.25These special accounts of the general trade and commer- ce representative in Serbia open for this purpose at the Banking Society had different names. "Sperrkonto" was a temporary ac- count containing expropriated Jewish property; "Sicherheiten" a temporary one-off account for completed expropriations; "Li- quidationserloese" and "Arisierungserloese" contained топеу from other accounts and collective sums from other one-off ac- *
24 See under 21; BD vault, in which Jewish property was kept, was at a 
branch office in 2 Terazije Street.
25 Miodrag Ugričić, Novac u Jugoslaviji za vreme Drugog svetskog rata, s 
naročitim osvrtom na metode finansiranja okupacije (Мопеу in Yugoslavia du- 
ring the World War Two, with special focus on the methods of financing the 
occupation), Beograd, 2000, p. 114-117.
counts, transferred by the special representative. It was also possible to make direct payments to these accounts. As of De- cember 1942, jewelry, golden coins and other valuables seized from Serbian Jews were also deposited in the vaults of the Ban- king Society. This is clear from the records of expropriated Je- wish property kept by the Societ^s clerks.26
26 ASCG, 151 - Archive material about the expropriation of Jevvish pro- 
perty in the Banking Society, 1942-1944; these files (made in alphabetical or- 
der and ad hoc, as the data from other banks were coming in) are incomple- 
te. All files under B, C, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, M, N and U are missing. According 
to our liberal estimate, this makes roughly one half of the total number. For 
instance, out of the files of 61 share holders of the Privilegovana agrikultuma 
banka (Priviledged Agricultural Bank), 31 files of Jewish share-holders are 
missing.
27 ASCG, 151, correspondence between the Banks Supervisory Office and 
Banking Society, Мау 12-18, 1943.
28 Idem; we came to an approximate value of the Jewish share capital in 
both banks by consulting the listing of "various shares expropriated from 
Jews" found in the "storeroom of the military commander for Balkan operati- 
ons - head of the military authority G.B.V", in 1945. The total value of the ех- 
propriated Jewish shares in banks, according to these documents, amounted 
to 15.189,710 dinars, i.e. 3.092,044 less than in the Banking Society's report 
to the Banks Supervisory Office. This difference is probably a consequence of 
withdrawals from the "storeroom" between 1943 and 1945.
Following the completion of these transfers, it tumed out that until 1940 Jewish capital participated in almost all private banks in Serbia, totaling 18.281,745 dinars, or 4.1 percent. Jews had a 50% or bigger share in Beogradska trgovačka štedi- onica (99.94%), Metropol banka (66.33%), Kolonijalna banka (64.10%) and Merkur banka (50%), all in Belgrade.27 28This figu- re did not include the share capital invested into the Privileged Agricultural Bank, totaling 5.285,500 dinars, nor the value of shares of the National Bank of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia ow- ned by Jews, amounting to 1.743,000 dinars?8 Unfortunately, the staff of the Banking Society failed to calculate the value of Jewish shares in manufacturing and trade companies. Jewish shares found in Neuhausen's storeroom and the records of ех- propriated Jewish property made . on the basis of reports from 
other banks,29 put the value of Jewish shares in Serbia's indu- stry, trade and mining at around 17.090,053 dinars.30 312
29 Idem.
30 See under 27.
31 Minutes of the testimony of Alelo>andar Ungar given on October 9, 
1945, from: Zločini fašističkih okupatora... (Crimes...) 47.
32 See note 27. Only the shares of another two companies, the First Bo- 
snian Asphalt Industry, from Sarajevo (100 shares at 750 dinars each) and 
"Kroatija", the manufacturer of portland cement, from Zagreb (320 shares at 
200 dinars each) were transferred from the same "Algemeine Depot" account 
to the storeroom. In some cases the figures from these two sources are iden-
Aleksandar Ungar, a Beočin steel plant share-holder, belie- ves these figures to be far too conservative: "After we'd leamed that the Jews in Belgrade were being decimated, we went into hiding... and through an intermediary made contact with Dr. Hajnsel of the Gestapo. He told us that the Gestapo would give us passes to leave Novi Sad if we agreed to sell our shares, now deposited in a vault in Beočin, belonging to myself and Julius John, and worth around 5 million dinars in those days. We we- re left with no choice: to die with the others or give away wha- tever property we'd had. So, in the presence of witnesses, we signed a contract with a Gestapo agent for the sale of our sha- res to Wiener Bankverein, for the price of 5,000 dinars, or 500 per share. In addition, we had to agree to have that топеу paid to an inaccessible account at Bankverein — you can still find proof of this in the official records. Nevertheless, the Gestapo refused to give us the passes, advising us instead to disappear from Belgrade".3i We found confirmation of this statement in the storeroom, where under "Beočin Steel Plant" it reads that the shares were transferred to there from a so-called Allgemei- ne Depot account. The name of their real owner was therefore unknown, unlike in the case of most other shares. Moreover, ne- ither the number of shares nor their value matches the figures mentioned in the statement. The storeroom contains 205 shares with a nominal value of 1,500 dinars, meaning that their total value was a mere 307,500 dinars.32
ЈWhile comparative analysis of these two sources shows that the numbers of recorded Jewish shares and their nominal value were occasionally incompatible, it was presumed that so- me of the expropriated bills were simply missing ffom the sto- reroom, and their total*value came at 77.010,322 dinars. The value of 90 savings accounts (and this is not their full number) amounted to 5.793,476 dinars and the totals of valuable life in- surance policies, which were more numerous than the bills and savings accounts combined, is unknown.33Interestingly, the storeroom did not contain апу jewelry, golden coins or other valuables seized from Serbian Jews that were repeatedly mentioned in the records of expropriated Je- wish property.34 In the region of Banat, a special procedure was developed for the expropriation of valuables ffom Jewish safes (usually opened by force in the presence of a special German commission). The items of value were submitted to the Panče- vo People's Bank for evaluation, which then forwarded them to the Banking Society, while the less valuable items were sold to the members of the Reich, at GBW's premises.35 A segment of the seized Jewish property, especially gold and other valuables, which were deposited in the bank since 1943, were taken to *
tical. For instance, the dossier of one Josif Amodaj (of 29, Jevremova Street, 
Belgrade) contains a letter from the Franco-Yugoslav Bank of December 14, 
1942 confirming that the Jew in question possessed 338 shares in that bank, 
worth 1,000 dinars each. The figure mentioned in the storeroom is exactly the 
same. The letter also states that "for the safekeeping of the above-mentioned 
bills until the end of this уеаг, as well as for the costs of breaking the safe, 
which have not been covered by the individual in question, we hereby charge 
with a debit of...", see: ASCG, 151, Records od expropriated Jewish ргорепу 
(in alphabetical order) in BD, 1942-1944.
33 See note 27; the high level of German "business pedantry" displayed 
during the expropriation of Jewish property is particularly evident in the han- 
dling of savings accounts, some of which contained less than 100 dinars (23 
or just 13).
34 Idem
35 ASCG, 151, Records od expropriated Jewish property in BD, 1942- 
1944; Zločini fašističkih okupatora... (Crimes...), 51.
Berlin in June that уеаг by the newly appointed commissary for Jewish property in Belgrade, Adolf Mostbek.36 378
36 ASCG, Reparations Commission of the Govemment of FNRY (54) f. 
513, evidence of the theft of Jewish property from the Banking Society in Bel- 
grade No. 15640, April 22, 1948.
37 ASCG, 151, Report from the session of the managing board of the Ban- 
king Society about the business policy in the fiscal уеаг 1943, held on April 
27, 1944. Comparisons with the 1942 annual report are needed primarily be- 
cause one part of the expropriated Jewish ргорепу was reflected in the balan- 
ce for 1942, and another in 1943.
38 Idem
39 Idem
40 Miodrag Ugričić, op. cit., p. 114-117; Vesna S. Aleksić, op. cit., p. 132- 
150.
With this in mind, one will read the 1943 annual report of the bank's management with more "understanding". The report shows a raise in balance by 333,000 dinars, i.e. from 1.674,000, in 1942, to 2.007,300, in 1943. This trend was even more noti- ceable in the accounts receivable, which went up by 158.60% (1942, i.e. by another 37.77% in 1943) - i.e. from 398.336,909 to 1.030,108.159 dinars in 1942, and by an additional 389 mil- lion in 1943.37 While in 1942 the savings dropped from 39.131,145 to 20.030,214 dinars, in 1943 they increased by 352%., i.e. to 108.6 million dinars. "The increase in volume of operations is evident from the tumout figures: from 22.404,000 to 47.065,000 dinars, or by 110%."38 In 1943, the bank's profits were at their highest since the bank's founding: 11.207,701 di- nars.39Yugoslav analysts put the numeral equivalent of the dama- ge from the exprorpiation of Jewish property in the occupied Serbia, facilitated by the Banking Society, at roughly 885.883,000 Serbian dinars or, according to the exchange rate from those days, 17.717,660 dolars. The bulk of it, mainly gold and other valuables, was sent to Germany in 1943. The rest was gradually transferred there in 1944, paid to business people and private individuals, or divided among the German military and political representatives in Serbia.40 A purely financial institu- 
tion successfully contributed to the establishment of interrela- tion between military and economic occupation of Serbia by the Third Reich, by facilitating the application of measures of eco- nomic exhaustion of the country. At the same time, it helped a systematic expropriation of the entire Jewish capital. Its case sets an example of successful racist experiment in the banking system in the occupied Serbia. A.D.
